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IDEOLOGY, COERCION, AND THE
PROPOSED RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS
Nancy S. Kim*
ABSTRACT

-

The Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts
(RLCC)has been the subject of much controversy and debate. To
those who are unfamiliar with the RLCC, the issues may seem abstract or even trivial. But to those who care about consumers and
consumers 'rights, the issues arereal, criticaland of enormous consequence. The outcome of this discussion determines what rights
consumers will have, how they will enforce them and the extent to
which unreadfine print can altersocietaland marketplace norms
for decades.
This Essay focuses on two provisions of the RLCC: § 2
Adoption of StandardContract Terms, which adopts the standard
of notice-and-manifestation;and §3 - Modification, which permits
modifications with notice-and-manifestationof assent (referredto
* ProFlowers Distinguished Professor of Internet Studies and Professor of Law,
California Western School of Law. This paper was prepared for a symposium
hosted by the Loyola Consumer Law Review on the American Law Institute's
proposed Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts which was to have
taken place at Loyola University Chicago School of Law on March 27, 2020, but
was cancelled due to the COVID-19 crisis. The author thanks the organizers
who put so much effort into planning that symposium. In particular, the author
thanks Suzanne Grossman, Caitlin Figueroa and the members of the Loyola
Consumer Law Review for their care in planning the symposium and editing
this symposium issue despite such unusual and challenging circumstances.
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as "notice-and-manifestation.')This Essay argues that the current
draft of the Restatement of Consumer Contracts engages in ideologically motivated rule-making by implementing two normative

shifts. First, it changes the law of electronic contracts of adhesion
by interpretingand adoptinga standardas a rule. The law of electronic adhesion contracts is currently in flux. The RLCC, however, assumes a coherence and stability with respect to the law of
electronic contractsof adhesion thatis belied by the case law. Second, it treats all consumerform contractsas electroniccontracts of
adhesion. The RLCC misreads the currentstate of the la w governing contracts and specifically, the law of consumer contracts. It
does this by confusing the law of consumer contracts with the law
of electronic adhesion contracts.
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INTRODUCTION

The proposed Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts (RLCC) has been the subject of much controversy and debate among academics' and in the popular press 2 - it even sparked
an organized student protest.3 Twenty-three state Attorney Generals signed a letter in opposition to it, stating that it "represents an
abandonment of important principles of consumer protection in

exchange for illusory benefits."4
To those who are unfamiliar with the RLCC, the issues may
seem abstract or even trivial. But to those who care about consumers and consumers' rights, the issues are real, critical and of
enormous consequence. The outcome of this discussion determines
what rights consumers will have, how they will enforce them and
the extent to which unread fine print can alter societal and marketplace norms for decades.

Symposium on the DraftRestatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts,
YALE J. REG., https://www.yalejreg.com/topic/symposium-on-the-draft-restatement-of-the-law-of-consumer-contracts/ (The blog for the Yale Journal on Regulation hosted an online symposium dedicated to the draft Restatement of the
Law of Consumer Contracts); See also Martha Ertman, ProperlyRestating the
Law of Consumer Contracting,JOTWELL (May 15, 2019), https://contracts.jotwell.com/properly-restating-the-law-of-consumer-contracting/; Gregory Klass,
Empiricism and Privacy Policies in the Restatement of Consumer Contract
Law, 36 YALE J. REG. 45 (2019); Adam J. Levitin et al., The FaultyFoundation
of the Draft Restatement of Consumer Contracts,36 YALE J. REG. 447 (2019).
2 David Dayen, The Secret Vote That Could Wipe A way Consumer Rights,
THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (May 20, 2019), https://prospect.org/culture/secretvote-wipe-away-consumer-rights/; Christian Hetrick, You needn't click 'I
agree' to be bound by a website's terms under postponedproposal from legal
experts, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (May 21, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/business/consumer-contract-american-legal-institute-terms-conditions-agree-20190521.html; Ian MacDougall, Soon You May Not Even Have to
Click on a Website Contractto be Bound by its Terms, PROPUBLICA (May 20,
2019),
https://www.propublica.org/article/website-contract-bound-by-itsterms-may-not-even-have-to-click.
3 People's Parity Project, Law Students Call for ALI Members to Reject
Proposalto Rig ContractLaw Against Consumers, PEOPLE'S PARITY PROJECT
(May 21, 2019), https://www.peoplesparity.org/alirestatement/.
4 Letter of State Atty. Generals, (May 14, 2019), https://www.ali.org/smedia/filer-private/97/45/97453efb- 1e75-4597-9298-c2 a2 2 ace07 11/consumer__stateags_-_may_14.pdf.
1
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This Essay focuses on two provisions of the RLCC: § 2
Adoption of Standard Contract Terms, which adopts the standard
of notice-and-manifestation of assent ("notice-and-manifestation."), and §3 - Modification, which permits modifications with

notice-and-manifestation. This Essay argues that the current draft
of the RLCC engages in ideologically motivated rule-making by
implementing two normative shifts.

First, it changes the law of

electronic contracts of adhesion by interpreting and adopting a
standard as a rule. The law of electronic adhesion contracts is currently in flux. The RLCC, however, assumes a coherence and stability with respect to the law of electronic contracts of adhesion
that is belied by the caselaw. Second, it treats all consumer form
contracts as electronic contracts of adhesion. The RLCC misreads
the current state of the law governing contracts and specifically,
the law of consumer contracts. It does this by confusing the law of
consumer contracts with the law of electronic contracts of adhesion. This RLCC-constructed uniformity works to the disadvantage of consumers and, in the words of the contracts scholar,
Melvin Eisenberg, drives "a dagger through consumers' rights."5
As this Essay explains, these two normative moves ignore the purpose of a law of contracts and specifically, a law of consumer contracts.

By prioritizing a narrow view of efficiency over fairness,

-

the RLCC essentially imposes a law that dismisses the value of
consent and sanctions coercion in contracting.
The harms posed by the draft are more than monetary
they include harms to basic civil liberties and human rights.6 As
the marketplace becomes more personalized, consumers unwittingly become both the product and the customer. Enabled by fine
print which both grants permissions and limits liabilities, compa-

nies will be free to gather information that makes it easier to manipulate and discriminate against consumers. The RLCC ignores
s Melvin A. Eisenberg, The ProposedRestatement of Consumer Contracts,
ifAdopted, Would Drive a Dagger through Consumers'Rights, Notice & Comment
blog
of
the
YALE
J.
REG.
(March
20,
2019),
https://www.yalej reg.com/nc/the-proposed-restatement-of-consumer-contractsif-adopted-would-drive-a-dagger-through-consumers-rights-by-melvin-eisenberg/.
6

See

MARGARET

JANE

RADIN,

BOILERPLATE:

THE

FINE

PRINT,

VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAw (2013) (arguing that fine print in
for contracts had led to "democratic degradation" in that "systems of contracts
can delete rights that are granted through democratic processes, substituting for
them the system that the firm wishes to impose."); Id at 16.
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the potential consequences of contractual coercion in a world besieged by digital terms and intrusive technologies. The coercive
contracting regime sanctioned and perpetuated by the RLCC
erodes consent and promotes social and economic inequality by
permitting businesses to draft one-sided clauses that minimize
their risks and allow them to reallocate rights that benefit them
and disadvantage consumers.
Part II of this Essay summarizes and outlines the current
law of consumer contracts and the law of wrap contracts.' Part III
explains how the RLCC misinterprets and distorts existing law.

Part IV argues that the RLCC's approach is coercive because it
replaces consent with a legal fiction and leaves consumers vulnerable to opportunistic drafting. This Essay concludes that the current RLCC establishes and sanctions a legal regime that values a
narrow, short-sighted vision of efficiency over fairness. The narrow, short-sighted view of efficiency engenders consumer skepticism and prompts governmental regulation, creating compliance

requirements and increasing transaction costs. Consequently, the
coercive approach adopted by the RLCC ultimately impedes rather than promotes efficiency.

II.

OVERVIEW OF THE LAW OF CONSUMER
CONTRACTS
A. General

In order to be properly formed, contracts require offer, acceptance, mutual assent or consent, and consideration.' Courts,
' I first used the term wrap contracts as a general term to refer to any "unilaterally imposed set of terms which the drafter proposes to be legally binding
and which is presented to the nondrafting party in a nontraditional format"
meaning that it is not signed with a pen (or an electronic signature). See NANCY
S. KIM, WRAP CONT.: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 2-3 (2013). In this
essay, I use the term to refer to shrinkwraps, clickwraps, browsewraps and
other, primarily electronic, adhesive forms that are not signed with a pen or an
electronic signature. Unlike clickwrap and browsewrap contracts, shrinkwrap
contracts are not electronic, but they are important to the discussion of electronic
adhesion contracts because they paved the way for the standard of "notice-andmanifestation" for online contract formation. See discussion, infra Section II.B.
8 See Chisholm v. Ultima Nashua Indus. Corp., 834 A.2d 221, 225 (N.H.
2003) ("Offer, acceptance, and consideration are essential to contract formation .... In addition, there must be a meeting of the minds in order to form a

460
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however, tend to be flexible in assessing whether these doctrinal
requirements are met. When there is a signed agreement, courts
have tended to find mutual assent even if the signing party did not
actually understand or read the contents of the agreement.9 Not
all contracts require a signature. Contracts can be accepted verbally. They can also be accepted through conduct which manifests an intent to be bound to an agreement." Contract law adopts
valid contract. A meeting of the minds is present when the parties assent to the
same terms."); Legro v. Robinson, 328 P.3d 238, 246 (Colo. App. 2012) ("A contract is formed when one party makes an offer and the other accepts it, and the
agreement is supported by consideration.") (quoting Sumerel v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 232 P.3d 128, 133 (Colo. App. 2009)); Int'l Indus. Contracting
Corp. v. Sofir Italia s.r.l., 2017 WL 3499899, *at 3 (E.D. Mich., Aug. 16, 2017)
(stating the elements of a contract to include "(1) parties competent to contracts,
(2) a proper subject matter, (3) a legal consideration, (4) mutuality of agreement,
and (5) mutuality of obligation."); Bowles v. OneMain Fin. Group., LLC, 927
F.3d 878, 882 (5th Cir. 2019) (noting that in Mississippi, the element of a contract
consist of "(1) two or more contracting parties, (2) consideration, (3) an agreement that is sufficiently definite, (4) parties with legal capacity to make a contract, (5) mutual assent, and (6) no legal prohibition precluding contract formation."); Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. The Container Store, Inc., 904 F.3d 70, 81
(1st Cir. 2018) ("One could challenge the formation of a contract by claiming one
of the essential elements (offer, acceptance, and consideration) is missing...A
challenge to formation can also be done by showing that one party never agreed
to the terms of the contract, that a signatory did not possess the authority to
commit the principal, or that the signor lacked the mental capacity to assent.");
Norcia v. Samsung Telecomm. America, LLC, 845 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir.
2017) ("Generally, under California law, "the essential elements for a contract
are (1) '[p]arties capable of contracting;' (2) '[t]heir consent;' (3) '[a] lawful object;' and (4) '[s]ufficient cause or consideration."' (citing CA Civ. Code §1550)).
9 Davis v. Winfield, 664 A.2d 836, 838 (D.C. 1995) (finding that mutual assent is "most clearly evidenced by the terms of a signed written agreement");
Jones v. U-Haul Co. of Mass. and Ohio Inc., 16 F. Supp. 3d 922, 933 (S.D. Ohio,
2014) (finding that "parties must objectively manifest an intent to be bound" and
a signed agreement "objectively evidenced a (sic) intent to be bound by its terms"
even though plaintiff did not understand the agreement).
10

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §19 (AM. LAW INST., 1981)

("The manifestation of assent may be made wholly or partly by written or spoken words or by other acts or by failure to act.").
" Id; see also Norcia v. Samsung Telecomm. America, LLC, supranote 8,
at 1284 (noting that parties may form a contract through conduct); see also UCC
§2-204(1) ("A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient
to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.").
461
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an objective standard, meaning that it assumes the parties understand their words and deeds as a reasonable person would understand them. 2

Even though the purpose of contract law is to determine the
intent of the parties it is only to enforce their reasonable (rather
than subjective) expectations. The objective standard was a practical necessity that balanced concerns about individual autonomy
with concerns about predictability and security of transactions. In
the context of a negotiated agreement, the duty to read made sense.
" A reasonable person would believe that someone who signed a
contract had read the terms. 4 A reasonable person who signs a
contract should know that it manifests consent to the terms of the
agreement. A reasonable person should also know that someone
who sees that a contract is signed would reasonably believe that
the signer intended to be bound by its terms."
With consumer contracts, the manifestation of consent (the
signature) often does not reflect what it does in a negotiated agreement between commercial entities. 6 Consumers often don't read
contracts that they sign because they are not represented by counsel, do not understand legalese, and may find it pointless to do so
because they have no ability to negotiate different terms."

Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 771 F.3d 559, 565 (9th Cir. 2014)
("Courts must determine whether the outward manifestations of consent would
lead a reasonable person to believe the offeree has assented to the agreement.").
13 The so-called "duty to read" refers to the understanding that someone who
signs a contract is charged with knowing what the contracts says. See Charles
L. Knapp, Is there a 'Duty to Read", 66 HASTINGS L. J. 1083 (2015) (discussing
the meaning of a duty to read).
14 Marin Storage & Trucking, Inc. v. Benco Contracting and Eng'g, Inc., 89
Cal. App. 4th 1042, 1049 (Ct. App. 2001) ("A party cannot avoid the terms of a
contract on the ground that he or she failed to read it before signing.").
1S Knapp, supra note 13, at 1085-86 (stating that the duty to read is not a
"duty" but "rather a statement about how parties should behave during the contract-making process."). Id at 1085-86.
16 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 311 (1986)
("the 'duty to read' imposed by classical contract law had no connection to human reality in the case of dense-text form contracts.").
17 Most readers will have personal experience not reading contracts. Melvin
Eisenberg writes that "it is reasonable" for "consumers who are faced with the
dense text of form contracts" to "respond by refusing to read." Id. at 305. See
also Shmuel Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The
Challenge That is Yet to be Met, 45 AM. BUs. L. J. 723, 729-737 (2008)
462
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Companies know that consumers don't read their contracts before
signing them. Imposing the duty to read with adhesive contracts
seems harsh, but the alternative of not recognizing signed contracts
would make it difficult to recognize consumer contracts at all and
might impede transactions and the smooth functioning of the marketplace.
Legislators responded to harsh terms in adhesive form contracts by passing consumer protective laws and special statutory
provisions to address the contracting realities faced by consumers.
For example, the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") creates a default rule that sales of goods are protected by warranties, both express and implied. 8 It also codifies the doctrine of unconscionability, although it does not precisely define it.' 9 It is generally agreed,
however, that unconscionability means an "absence of meaningful
choice" on the part of one party with terms "unreasonably favorable" to the other party. 20 The "absence of meaningful choice" captures "procedural unconscionability" and "unreasonably favorable" captures "substantive unconscionability." 2 The procedural
element of unconscionability focuses on "oppression" and "surprise." Oppression of the adhering party occurs due to bargaining
imbalance. Surprise results from the terms being hidden or unexpected. As one court noted, "(s)urprise involves the extent to which
the supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in a
prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the disputed terms."22 Businesses are generally viewed as being less

(discussing the "debate and controversy" over the duty to read when applied to
consumers and related issues regarding imperfect information).
18 UCC §§2-312
- 2-315.
19 UCC §2-302; see also A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d
473, 485-86 (Ct. App. 1982) ("The Uniform Commercial Code does not attempt
to precisely define what is or is not "unconscionable.").
20 Williams v. Walker -Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
21 A&M Produce Co., supra note 19, at 486 (noting that "unconscionability
has both a 'procedural' and a 'substantive' element."); see also Melissa T.
Lonegrass, FindingRoom for Fairnessin Formalism - The Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability,44 LoY. U. CHi. L.J 1(2012) (discussing the "sliding
scale" approach to unconscionability and arguing that it provides "meaningful
scrutiny of contract terms").
22 A&M Produce Co., supra note 19, at 486.
463
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susceptible to surprise than consumers or unsophisticated businesses.23

Courts temper the harshness of the duty to read by scrutinizing the fine print and the contracting process for unfairness.24

They view skeptically boilerplate clauses such as integration
clauses, refusing to permit such clauses to defeat consumer claims
of fraud. 5
In addition to the doctrine of unconscionability, courts may
apply the doctrine of reasonable expectations. The doctrine of reasonable expectations is often applied to insurance contracts which
are "contracts of adhesion because of the uneven bargaining positions of the parties." 21 Under the doctrine, "if the insurer or its
agent creates a reasonable expectation of coverage in the insured
which is not supported by the policy language, the expectation will
prevail over the language of the policy."2 7
Although underutilized, 21 the doctrine of reasonable expectations is not limited to insurance contracts. As the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma stated,
Id

at 489-90 ("With increasing frequency, courts have begun to recognize
that experienced but legally unsophisticated businessmen may be unfairly surprised by unconscionable contract terms and that even large business entities
may have relatively little bargaining power, depending on the identity of the
other contracting party and the commercial circumstances surrounding the
agreement.") (citations omitted).
24 Id. at 484 (noting that "an unconscionable disclaimer of warranty may be
denied enforcement" and that "unconscionability is a flexible doctrine designed
to allow courts to directly consider numerous factors which may adulterate the
contractual process."; Williams, supranote 20.
25 See Barrientos v. Sulit, 509 N.Y.S.2d 288 (N.Y. City Ct. 1986) (finding
that evidence of express oral warranty not precluded by written car purchase
agreement); Carpetland U.S.A. v. Payne, 536 N.E.2d 306, 309 (Ind. Ct. App.
1989) ("If it is unreasonable or impossible to construe the language of an express
warranty and the language of a disclaimer as consistent, the disclaimer becomes
inoperative."); Richardson v. Car Lot Co., 462 N.E.2d 459, 461 (Akron Mun. Ct.
1983) (finding that a "sold as is" clause printed on the agreement did not apply).
26 Max True Plastering Co. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861, 864
(Okla. 1996).
27 Id
28 See Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a FairerModel
of Consumer Assent to
Standard Form Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82
WASH. L. REV. 227, 231(2007) (noting that the reasonable expectations doctrine
is "(o)verlooked and underappreciated in the debate over the proper treatment
of standard form contracts."); Eric Zacks, The Restatement (Second) of
464
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"(t)he doctrine of reasonable expectations has evolved as
an interpretive tool to aid courts in discerning the intention of the parties bound by adhesion contracts. It developed in part because established equitable doctrines were
inadequate, and it takes into account the realities of present-day commercial practice." 29

Thus, there are two ways that courts may limit the enforcement of adhesive contracts. The first is through the doctrine of
reasonable expectations. The second is that even i/within the reasonable expectations of the parties, a contract or provision will be
denied enforcement if it is "unduly oppressive" or "unconscionable."
In some cases, the consumer is not asked to sign anything
at all. The duty to read does not apply if the writing did not appear
to be a contract and the terms were not called to the attention of
the recipient." In an early case, The Majestic, the U.S. Supreme
Court stated:
"(w)hen a company desires to impose special and most
stringent terms upon its customers, in exoneration of its
own liability, there is nothing unreasonable in requiring

Contracts §211: Unfulfilled Expectationsand the Futureof Modern Standard-

ized Consumer Contracts, 7 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV. 733 (2016) (finding that
the doctrine was seldom effective even though it is a "thoughtful" and "elegantly
designed" solution to the problem of assent to modern standardized contracts.").
Id at 736.
29

Id

See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 172-73 (Cal. 1981) ("Generally speaking there, there are two judicially imposed limitations on the enforcement of adhesion contracts or provisions thereof. The first is that such a
contract or provision which does not fall within the reasonable expectations of
the weaker or 'adhering' party will not be enforced against him. The second a
principle of equity applicable to all contract generally is that a contract or provision, even if consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties, will be
denied enforcement if, considered in its context, it is unduly oppressive or 'unconscionable."').
31 Marin Storage & Trucking, Inc. v. Benco Contracting and Eng'g, Inc., 89
Cal. App. 4th 1042, 1049-50 (Ct. App. 2001) (noting that "when the writing does
not appear to be a contract and the terms are not called to the attention of the
recipient" than "no contract is formed with respect to the undisclosed term.").
30
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that those terms shall be distinctly declared and deliberately accepted."

2

Subsequently, the Second Circuit interpreted The Majestic
holding as requiring that a carrier had done "all it reasonably could
do to warn the passenger that the terms and conditions were important matters of contract affecting his legal rights."" Cases involving tickets, such as cruise ship passenger tickets, typically require "reasonable notice" of critical terms3 4 or apply a "reasonable
communicativeness" test.35 The reasonable communicativeness
test is generally applied to tickets because they do not resemble traditional contracts and the recipient may not be aware of their contractual nature.
The Ninth Circuit explained that the first prong of the reasonable communicativeness test focused on the physical characteristics of the ticket, including the "type, conspicuousness and clarity
of notice on the face of the ticket, and the ease with which a passenger can read the provisions in questions."3 6 The second prong
of the test requires an evaluation of
" 'the circumstances surrounding the passenger's pur-

chase and subsequent retention of the ticket/contract.'""
The circumstances included "the passenger's familiarity
with the ticket, the time and incentive under the circum-

stances to study the provisions of the ticket, and any
other notice that the passenger received outside of the
ticket." This prong allows us to examine more subjective,

The Majestic, 166 U.S. 375, 386 (1897).
3 Silvestri v. Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Navigazione, 388 F.2d 11, 17 (2d
Cir. 1968).
3 Barbachym v. Costa Line, Inc., 713 F.2d 216, 218-19 (6th Cir. 1983) (noting the "reasonable notice requirement" of earlier cases, and that "(t)he 'reasonableness' of notice to the passengers of critical terms of carriage contracts is a
question of law.").
3 See Deiro v. American Airlines, Inc., 816 F.2d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1987)
(adopting the reasonable communicativeness test and noting that the "Second,
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have also adopted this 'reasonable communicativeness' test to determine when the passenger of a common carrier is contractually
bound by the fine print of a passenger ticket.").
36 Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 836 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
" Id (citations omitted).
466
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"extrinsic factors indicating the passenger's ability to become meaningfully informed (citations omitted)."3 8

Thus, the law of consumer contracts distinguishes between
a contract whose form communicates its contractual nature and a
contract, such as a ticket, which does not. In the former case, a
consumer may try to avoid enforcement of the contract or a particular provision using the reasonable expectations or unconscionability doctrines. In the case where the form is not obviously contractual, the drafting business must prove that the specific
provision it wishes to enforce was reasonably communicated to the
consumer as legally binding.
B. The Law of Wrap Contracts
1. Rolling Contract Theory
Electronic adhesion contracts are adhesive in nature and
unsigned, like cruise ship tickets; yet, they can be dozens of pages
long and create an ongoing relationship, like insurance contracts.
Courts seem to have conflated the doctrinal rules applicable to different contract forms to conjure up the standard of "reasonable notice" and "manifestation of assent." But the decision to apply this
notice-and-manifestation standard to adhesive form contracts has
its origins in politics and ideology, not doctrine. It was a deliberate
move on the part of a judge steeped in the law and economics
movement to replace contractual consent with efficiency in two
cases that made new law. That judge was Frank Easterbrook, a
former law professor at the University of Chicago, and the cases
40 This pair of
were ProCD v. Zeidenberg 9 and Hill v. Gateway.

cases set the precedent for the divergent stream of contract law
that I refer to as 'wrap contract' law. 41 The wrap contract at issue
in ProCD v. Zeidenbergwas a "shrinkwrap," so named because it
was contained in a package that was then wrapped in plastic or

38

Id; see also Deiro, supranote 35 at 1364.

40

ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
Hill v. Gateway, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).

41

NANCY

39

S.

KIM,

WRAP

CONTRACTS:

FOUNDATIONS

AND

RAMIFICATIONS, at 109-111(2013); see also Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp.
3d 359, 385-86 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (summarizing doctrinal differences between
contract law and wrap contract law).
467
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"shrinkwrapped." The agreement was received by the customer
after the software had been purchased.
Prior to ProCD, an offer could be made by submitting a
purchase order, by placing an order by telephone, or by bringing
an item to the cash register. The offer could be accepted verbally,
by written confirmation or by delivering the product to the customer. The contract was formed after acceptance. ProCDignored
the standard formulations and came up with its own theory of contract formation which has come to be known as the "rolling theory"
or "rolling contract theory." According to the rolling contract theory, a contract could be formed by notifying the customer that
terms exist which will be presented after the offer had already been
accepted. After the terms were made available, the customer had
the opportunity to reject them. If the customer did not reject them
after having an opportunity to read them, the customer was
deemed to have accepted these terms even though the contracthad
already been formed. The rolling contract theory deviates from
the general doctrinal rule that silence does not constitute acceptance. It also deviates from the rule that conduct can sometimes constitute acceptance because in a rolling contract scenario
the offeree has alreadyaccepted the offer at the time the terms are
presented. Finally, it deviates from the general rule that a party
cannot unilaterally modify the terms of a contract.
Justice Neil Gorsuch, when he was sitting on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, referred to the rolling contract theory as
"about as controversial an idea as exists today in the staid world of
contract law."4 2 He further noted that:
-

"Some states endorse the theory, but others reject it

holding that a seller's later-arriving written contract con-

stitutes at most only a proposal to modify a preexisting
oral contract, and that a buyer's assent to the proposed
modification won't be inferred simply from the buyer's
continuing the preexisting oral contract." 43

The rolling contract theory was expressly rejected by the
court in Klocek v. Gateway, Inc.44 which also pointedly noted that

Howard v. Ferrellgas Partners, L.P., 748 F.3d 978, 982 (10th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 982. (The court added that Kansas was among those states that reject the rolling theory of contract formation.).
44 Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339-42 (D. Kan. 2000).
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ProCDhad no authority for its claim that UCC § 2-207 applied
only where there was more than one form:
"The Court is not persuaded that Kansas or Missouri

courts would follow the Seventh Circuit reasoning in Hill
and ProCD. In each case, the Seventh Circuit concluded
without support that UCC § 2-207 was irrelevant because the cases involved only one written form. See
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (citing no authority); Hill, 105
F.3d at 11150 (citing ProCD). This conclusion is not supported by the statute or by Kansas or Missouri law. Dis-

putes under § 2-207 often arise in the context of a 'battle
of forms,' see e.g., Diatom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741
F.2d 1569, 1574 (10th Cir., 1984), but nothing in its language precludes application in a case which involves only
one form." 45

It is important to note that the drafters of the UCC intentionally included provisions to protect consumers against potential
overreach and the imposition of unfair terms by businesses in
standard form contracts. Section 2-207 (2) of the Uniform Commercial Code, for example states that "additional terms" are "construed as proposals for addition to the contract" unless the transaction is "(b)etween merchants" in which case they become part of
the transaction unless they materially alter it or objection to them
has been made. 46 The words "(b)etween merchants" implies that
as between a merchant and a consumer, additional terms are not
part of the contract unless the consumer has specifically assented
to them. 47 There would be no reason to add the provision
"(b)etween merchants" otherwise.
Id at 1339.
UCC § 2-207 (2) states: "The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part
of the contract unless:
The offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
They materially alter it; or
Notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a
reasonable time after notice of them is received."
47 Klocek, supra note 44, at 1341 ("Because plaintiff is not a merchant, additional or different terms contained in the Standard Terms did not become part
of the parties' agreement unless plaintiff expressly agreed to them."); see also
Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 102 (3d Cir. 1991);
Wachter Mgmt. Co. v. Dexter & Chaney, Inc., 282 Kan. 365, 372 (2006)
469
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Prior to ProCD, most courts would have considered a form
with additional terms presented after a contract was formed to
have been governed by UCC § 2-207. The Third Circuit in StepSaver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech.4 8 expressly applied UCC § 2207 to the terms of a "box-top" license. In doing so, it cited to an
official comment to that section:
"1. This section is intended to deal with two typical situations. The one is the written confirmation, where an

agreement has been reached either orally or by informal
correspondence between the parties and is followed by
one or more of the parties sending formal memoranda
embodying the terms so far as agreed upon and adding
terms not discussed ....
2. Under this Article a proposed deal which in commercial understanding has in fact been closed is recognized
as a contract. Therefore, any additional matter contained
in the confirmation or in the acceptance falls within subsection (2) and must be regarded as a proposal for an
added term unless the acceptance is made conditional on
the acceptance of the additional or different terms."
Judge Easterbrook in ProCD v. Zeidenberg, however, interpreted UCC § 2-207 as applying to only those transactions
where there was more than one form; 49 however, he failed to cite
any precedent or authority."
ProCDwas cited by several courts as precedent and is relied
upon heavily by the RLCC to justify the adoption of the noticeand-manifestation standard. But as now-Justice Gorsuch noted,
the rationale in ProCDhas been far from uniformly adopted.
("Proposed amendments that materially alter the original agreement are not considered part of the contract unless both parties agree to the amendments. UCC
§ 2-209 requires express assent to the proposed modification") (citations omitted)).
48 Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
49 ProCD, supra note 39, at 1452 ("Our case has only one firm; UCC § 2-207
is irrelevant.").
" Klocek, supra note 44, at 1339-40 ("By its terms, § 2-207 applies to an
acceptance or written confirmation. It states nothing which requires another
form before the provision becomes effective.... In addition, the Seventh Circuit
provided no explanation for its conclusion that 'the vendor is the master of the
offer."').
470
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2. Electronic Contracts of Adhesion

The early cases tended to accept clickwraps as valid contract forms because the click indicated that the user had received
notice, had an opportunity to read the terms, and had manifested
assent to them. Browsewraps were more difficult to prove. If the
offeree did not have actual notice, there could be no actual manifestation of assent since the offeree could not manifest assent to an
agreement that the offeree did not know existed. 5' Consequently,
constructive notice means that the manifestation of assent is also
constructive.

Ironically, the standard of notice-and-manifestation came
from a case which expressed skepticism about electronic adhesion
contracts, Specht v. Netscape Comm 's Corp.s 2 The Second Circuit

found a contract was not formed in that case due to a lack of notice
and stated:
"Reasonably conspicuous notice of the existence of the
contract terms and unambiguous manifestation of assent
to those terms by consumers are essential if electronic
bargaining is to have integrity and credibility.""
The standard was thus articulated as a minimum which the business in that case failed to meet.
The standard of notice-and-manifestation generated much
confusion and some courts lost sight that the purpose of the standard was to help establish, and not undermine, the credibility of
electronic bargaining. Eventually, the standard of notice-andmanifestation created a divergent stream of contract law which
sometimes (but not always) permitted silence to constitute acceptance regardless of parties' intent and which sometimes (but
not always) defeated the reasonable expectations of the parties.
What does reasonable notice mean? To some courts, it seems to
mean visibility, but to others, it seems to mean informed awareness
of specific terms. The standard lacks predictability and certainty
and thus, diminishes the integrity and credibility of electronic bargaining.

Si The opportunity to read requirement was usually not at issue in online
contracting cases because, at least theoretically, the consumer had time to review the terms before commencing with the transaction.
52 Specht v. Netscape Comm's Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002).
3 Id at 30.
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But there is hope on the horizon. While earlier cases focused solely or primarily on the text in assessing the reasonableness
of notice, more recent cases place more emphasis on the context
and the contracting experience.54 The turning point in the law of

electronic contracts of adhesion seems to have arrived with two
pivotal cases: Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, Inc.5 and Berkson v.
Gogo, LLC 6 Both these cases provide more guidance regarding
when notice should be considered reasonable, including how to
present terms.

In Nguyen v. Barnes & Nobles, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
stated that the agreement must have put a "reasonably prudent
user" on "inquiry notice of the terms of the contract."5 7 Inquiry
notice "depends on the design and content of the website and the
agreement's webpage."5 8 The court noted that the placement of
the agreement on the website page matters 9 as well as whether
there is an "explicit textual notice that continued use will act as a
manifestation of the user's intent to be bound".6 0 But the court
noted that "proximity or conspicuousness of the hyperlink alone is
not enough to give rise to constructive notice." 6' Notably, even
making the terms of use available via a "conspicuous hyperlink on
" For a summary of the trend in electronic cases, see Nancy S. Kim, Online
Contracting:Recent Developments, Survey of the Law of Cyberspace, 72 THE
BUSINESS LAWYER (Winter 2016-2017); Nancy S. Kim, DigitalContracts: New
Developments, Survey of the Law of Cyberspace, 75 THE BUS. LAWYER 1683
(Winter 2019-2020); Nancy S. Kim, Juliet M. Moringiello and John E. Ottaviani,
Notice andAssent Through TechnologicalChange: The EnduringRelevance of
the Work of the ABA Joint Working Group on Electronic ContractingPractices,
75 THE BUS. LAWYER 1725 (Spring 2020).
ss Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014).
56 Berkson v. Gogo LLC., 97 F. Supp. 3d 359 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
" Nguyen, supra note 55, at 1177. ("But where, as here, there is no evidence
that the website user had actual knowledge of the agreement, the validity of the
browsewrap agreement turns on whether the website puts a reasonably prudent
user on inquiry notice of the terms of the contract.").
58

Id

59 Id ("Where the link to a website's terms of use is buried at the bottom of
the page or tucked away in obscure corners of the website where users are unlikely to see it, courts have refused to enforce the browsewrap agreement.").
60 Id ("On the other hand, where the website contains an explicit textual
notice that continued use will act as a manifestation of the user's intent to be
bound, courts have been more amenable to enforcing browsewrap agreements.").
61 Id at 1178.
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every page of the website" is insufficient to give rise to constructive
notice.62 Even more noteworthy was the court's articulation of the
balance of burdens regarding notice, implying that the business
must make the terms hard to miss, rather than that the user must
exercise diligence in seeking them out:
"While failure to read a contract before agreeing to its
terms does not relieve a party of its obligations under the
contract, the onus must be on website owners to put users
on notice of the terms to which they wish to bind consumers. Given the breadth of the range of technological
savvy of online purchasers, consumers cannot be expected to ferret out hyperlinks to terms and conditions to
which they have no reason to suspect they will be
bound." 63
The court in Berkson v. Gogo, LLC. echoed similar sentiments regarding the balance of burdens, underscoring that "there
is a difference between paper and electronic contracting" and that
"internet consumers...require clearer notice than do traditional retail buyers." 64 It noted that
"In the absence of contrary proof, it can be assumed that
the burden should be on the offeror to impress upon the
offeree - i.e. the average internet user - the importance of

the details of the binding contract being entered into." 5
Importantly, the court stated that "(t)he burden should include the
duty to explain the relevance of the critical terms governing the
offeree's substantive rights contained in the contract." 66
The Berkson court, after carefully examining past research
and precedent, summarized the following general principles regarding the formation of electronic adhesion contracts:
"First,"terms of use" will not be enforced where there is
no evidence that the website user had notice of the agreement;...

62
63
64
65

Id at 1178-79.
Id at 1179 (citations omitted).
Berkson, supra note 56, at 382.
Id at 382.

66 Id
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Second, "terms of use" will be enforced when a user is
encouraged by the design and content of the website and
the agreement's webpage to examine the terms clearly
available through hyperlinkage....
Third, "terms of use" will not be enforced where the link
to a website's terms is buried at the bottom of a webpage
or tucked away in obscure corners of the website where
users are unlikely to see it...."67
The court then developed the following four-part test to analyze electronic contracts of adhesion:
"(1) Aside from clicking the equivalent of sign-in (e.g.,

log-in, buy-now, purchase, etc.), is there substantial evidence from the website that the user was aware that she
was binding herself to more than an offer of services or
goods in exchange for money? If not, the "terms of use,"
such as those dealing with venue and arbitration, should
not be enforced against the purchaser.
(2) Did the design and content of the website, including
the homepage, make the "terms of use" (i.e., the contract
details) readily and obviously available to the user? If
not, the "terms of use," such as those dealing with venue
and arbitration, should not be enforced against the purchaser.
(3) Was the importance of the details of the contract obscured or minimized by the physical manifestation of assent expected of a consumer seeking to purchase or subscribe to a service or product? If yes, then the "terms of
use," such as those dealing with venue and arbitration,
should not be enforced against the purchaser.
(4) Did the merchant clearly draw the consumer's attention to material terms that would alter what a reasonable
consumer would understand to be her default rights
when initiating an online consumer transaction from the

consumer's state of residence: The right to (a) not have a
payment source charged without notice (i.e., automatic
payment renewal); (b) bring a civil consumer protection
67

Id at 402.
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action under the law of her state of residence and in the
courts in her state of residence; and (c) participate in a
class or collective action? If not, then (a), (b), or (c) should
not be enforced against the consumer." 68
The court stressed that the "burden of showing agreement
to details of a contract... is on the vendors" because "(i)t is the vendor who designs the website and puts into it terms favoring itself."69 Furthermore, "adverse terms" such as mandatory arbitration clauses or forced venue clauses require "(p)roof of special
know-how based on the background of the potential buyer" or "adequate warning of adverse terms by the design of the agreement
page or pages.""

Both Berkson v. Gogo and Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, Inc.
have been remarkably influential and since those decisions, more
courts have started to carefully analyze the presentation of terms
from the user's perspective and to consider whether a contract has
been formed with respect to specific material terms or terms that
may alter the reasonable expectations of the parties." For example, the federal district court in Adwar Casting Co., Ltd. v. Star
Gems, Inc., 2 citing the Berkson test, stated that "if the user's attention was not clearly drawn to material terms that would alter
what a reasonable user would understand to be her default rights,
the terms should not be enforced."7 3 The court found that because
the user did not affirmatively assent to terms and conditions and
68

Id

69 Id

at 403.

70 Id

See, Sgouros v. TransUnion, 817 F.3d 1029, 1035 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting
that courts should not "presume that a person who clicks on a box that appears
on a computer screen has notice of all contents not only of that page but of other
content that requires further action (scrolling, following a link, etc.) Indeed, a
person using the Internet may not realize that she is agreeing to a contract at all,
whereas a reasonable person signing a physical contract will rarely be unaware
of that fact."); Long v. Provide Commerce, 245 Cal. App. 4th 855, 863-67 (2016)
(finding no conspicuous notice of terms regarding arbitration even though hyperlink to Term of Use was visible); Scotti v. Tough Mudder, Inc., 97 N.Y.S.3d
825, 835 (Sup. Ct. 2019) (noting that although the agreement was conspicuous,
the arbitration provision was not sufficiently conspicuous to put plaintiffs on
notice and was unenforceable).
72 Adwar Casting Co., Ltd. v. Star Gems, Inc., 342
F. Supp. 3d 297
(E.D.N.Y. 2018).
7 Id at 305.
7
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the user's attention "was not drawn to the referenced provision,"
the terms should not be enforced.74
In addition, the recent trend of cases requires clear evidence
in the form of documentation of notice, which often means that an
affirmative act of assent is required, such as clicking on an icon
which clearly indicates that doing so means entering into a contract.75 It also means the business must retain records of user access to the website and screenshots of the "webflow" or "checkout
flow" experienced by the user on specific dates. The "-flow" refers
to how the user engages with the website and the way it brings the
user from one page to another as the user experiences it. 76
III. HOW THE RLCC DISTORTS EXISTING LAW
A. The RLCC Version of the Notice-andManifestation
Standard
The RLCC does more than simply adopt the controversial
notice-and-manifestation standard. It articulates it in a way that
distorts existing case law. To understand how requires a close look
at the text of §2, which is set out in full below:

§ 2. Adoption of Standard Contract Terms
(a) A standard contract term is adopted as part of a consumer contract if the consumer manifests assent to the
transaction after receiving:

(1) a reasonable notice of the standard contract term
and of the intent to include the term as part of the
consumer contract, and

7 Id
7

See Id (finding that the "mere use of the website" did not constitute as-

sent).
76 See Starke v. SquareTrade, Inc., 913 F.3d 279, 289-93 (2d Cir. 2019) (examining screenshots to show how terms were presented and finding no reasonable notice); Scotti v. Tough Mudder, Inc., 97 N.Y.S. 3d 825, 835 (Sup. Ct. 2019)
(reviewing black and white copies of screenshots and finding them insufficient
to show how the arbitration clause "actually appeared to the user."); Weber v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 2018 WL 60169775 at 10 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (requiring "direct
evidence" of webflows on multiple purchase dates).
476
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(2) a reasonable opportunity to review the standard
contract term.

(b) When a standard contract term is available for review
only after the consumer manifests assent to the transaction, the standard contract term is adopted as part of the
consumer contract if:
(1) before manifesting assent to the transaction, the
consumer receives a reasonable notice regarding the
existence of the standard contract term intended to
be provided later and to be part of the consumer contract, informing the consumer about the opportunity
to review and terminate the contract, and explaining
that the failure to terminate would result in the
adoption of the standard contract term;
(2) after manifesting assent to the transaction, the
consumer receives a reasonable opportunity to review the standard contract term; and
(3) after the standard contract term is made available for review, the consumer has a reasonable opportunity to terminate the transaction without unreasonable cost, loss of value, or personal burden, and
does not exercise that power.
(c) If the consumer manifests assent to the transaction, a
contract exists even if some of the standard contract
terms are not adopted. In such case, the terms of the contract are those adopted under subsections (a) and (b), and,
if the consumer elects, the unadopted standard terms,
along with any terms supplied by law.
This Section makes several unprecedented changes to existing law. First, it adopts a formalistic, technical version of the notice-and-manifestation standard which has not been articulated
elsewhere. § 2(a) states that a "standard contract term is adopted"
if the consumer "manifests assent to the transaction"after receiving "a reasonable notice" and a "reasonable opportunity to review"
it (emphasis added). Yet, the cases involving electronic adhesion
contracts do not apply the notice-and-manifestation standard to
demonstrate that terms are adopted but rather to show that a contract is formed. A contract may be formed but certain terms may
477
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not be included if, as Berkson and other cases have held, the user's
attention was not drawn to them. Courts generally distinguish between awareness that terms govern a transaction and the specific
terms that are at issue in the dispute. The First Circuit, for example, noted that the "duty to read" did not apply where there was
"zero hint" that the terms of an arbitration agreement were contained in a loyalty program agreement." The RLCC, however,
would find that a manifestation of assent to the "transaction"
would suffice to adopt the contract term.
Furthermore, existing case law uses "reasonable notice" as
a standard while the RLCC would require only "a" reasonable notice. The insertion of the "a" turns a standard which requires analysis of the contracting process, into a kind of if/then safe-harbor
rule that would require only one notice that is deemed reasonable.
Yet, as the court in Salameno v. Gogo made clear, repeated exposure to terms is an important factor in assessing reasonableness. In
rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that there was no reasonable notice,
Judge Jack Weinstein - the same judge that decided Berkson
wrote:
`In contrast to the Berkson plaintiffs, the plaintiffs in the
instant case purchased and used Gogo's product many
more times. Each time, the plaintiffs purchased the product they were presented with a website containing the hyperlink to the terms of use, and received an e-mail containing the same link. Then, each time they signed-in to

use the product, they were again presented with the terms
of use hyperlink. Thus, unlike the plaintiffs in Berkson,
the plaintiffs here were repeatedly warned that by using
Gogo's product they were agreeing to the terms of use,
and they were repeatedly presented with a hyperlink to
those terms. (Citations omitted)." 8

The court noted that the plaintiffs in Berkson, on the other
hand, "would probably have seen the terms of use hyperlink only
once or a few times." 9 Contrary to what the RLCC states, reasonable notice requires more than a one-time receipt of "a reasonable
notice." Reasonable notice is a standard that requires examination
" Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, supranote 8 at 84.
78 Salameno v. Gogo Inc., No. 16-CV-0487, 2016 WL 4005783 *6 (E.D.N.Y.,
July. 25, 2016).
79 Id
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of the context in which it was received, as well as consideration of
who is receiving it. 80

In addition, Section 2(b) adopts the rolling contract theory
which, as previously noted, has been expressly rejected by many
courts, including the Ninth Circuit which rejected that approach
in a recent case, Velasquez-Reyes v. Samsung. 8 1 That case involved a booklet contained in a box containing a smartphone. The
court stated that "(u)nder California law, silence or inaction generally does not constitute acceptance of a contract" and California
courts have not adopted the "in-the-box" theory of assent. 2
The objection to the RLCC is about more than its adoption
of the controversial rolling contract theory and its transmogrification of the standard of notice-and-manifestation into an if/then
safe-harbor rule. It is that sanctioning this standard would impede
the development of the common law in a particularly unhelpful
manner. As explained in Part II, the law governing electronic ad-

hesion contracts is currently in a dynamic stage as courts consider
what the standard requires. Some courts, especially in earlier
cases, considered notice ex post, meaning that they looked at the
relevant term and considered whether the print itself was conspicuous. 83 Increasingly, however, courts are looking at the reasonableness of notice ex ante, meaning that they are considering the
conspicuousness of the notice within the context of the website, as
the user interacts with it. Unlike the earlier cases which focused
on the visibility of the terms when one was looking for them, more

recent cases understand that users engaging with a website are not
on the alert for terms. Rather, the user's experience and the context in which the terms are presented determine whether notice is
80 Salameno, supra note 78, at 6 (The court noted that "experienced users"
may be charged with knowledge of how hyperlinks work while "unsophisticated
lay internet users" may not be.).
81 Velasquez-Reyes v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 16-CV-01953-DMG-KK,

No. 17-56556, 777 Fed. App'x. 241 (9th Cir. 2019).
82 Id
at 2. ("(t)wo non-precedential decisions from California's intermediate
court of appeals, both of which address Hill only in passing, do not undermine
this conclusion."). Id at 2-3.
83 Moringiello, supra note 54, at 1330. (Moringiello argued that courts in
some of these early cases "(i)n their zeal to treat paper and electronic form contracts in an identical manner...ignored some important differences between paper and electronic communications." She further notes the erroneousness of this
approach as "throughout history new forms of contracting have led courts to
refashion existing contract doctrine.").
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reasonable. For example, in Cullinane v. Uber Tech., Inc., the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated that notice "must be
contextualized" and "may not be read in a vacuum" and concluded
that "similarly displayed terms presented simultaneously to the
user in both versions of the third screen diminished the conspicuousness" of the Terms of Service hyperlink. In another case, Theodore v. Uber,84 the district court distinguished "high level contextual analysis" from "micro-analysis of particularized elements of
the context"85 and found no conspicuous notice. 86
The RLCC's focus on case-counting rather than legal analysis causes it to overlook the trend of cases, led by Barnes &Noble
and Berkson v. Gogo, which are considering whether the drafting

business met its burden of presenting specific terms in a reasonable
manner. Furthermore, the RLCC ignores entirely the 4-part test
set forth in Berkson87 even though it would provide more certainty
and predictability regarding how the standard should be applied.
B. Notice-and-ManifestationDoes Not (andShould Not)
Apply to All Consumer Contracts
The RLCC attempts to legislate the common law of consumer contracts by adopting a modified version of a controversial
standard as a rule and then applying that rule to allconsumer contracts. There is no authority for applying a "notice-and-manifestation" standard to paper-based contracts. As one California court
noted, "an offeree, regardless of apparent manifestation of his consent, is not bound by inconspicuous contractual provisions of
which he was unaware, contained in a document whose contractual nature is not obvious." 8 The standard of notice-and-manifestation discards the requirement of knowing consent, and the
RLCC would apply this standard as a rule to all consumer transactions, relational or discrete, and involving contracts printed on
paper or digital, offline or online, signed or unsigned.

84

Theodore v. Uber Tech., Inc., 442 F. Supp. 3d 433 (D. Mass. 2020).

85

Id at 442.

86

Id

87

See, Adwar Casting Co., supranote 72, at 305 (citing the Berkson test and

noting that it has been "favorably cited and applied by federal and state trial
courts.").
88 Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 987, 993
(Ct. App. 1972).
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The RLCC articulation of the standard, and its effort to apply it to all types of consumer transactions is simply wrong; it is a
normative move unsupported by caselaw. For example, Cmt. 6
Adoption of terms by entry to, or use of, a proprietaryenvironment
of the business- states:

"The deliberate act of entering the business's proprietary
environment and remaining in its long enough to gain access to the

content and benefits it confers constitutes a manifestation of assent
by the consumer to a transaction... .If such notice and opportunity
to review are provided to the consumer prior to entry, the standard
contract terms are adopted upon entry." 89
It then provides the following Illustrations:
"8. A consumer parks her car in a private parking lot. A
prominent sign at the entrance to the lot states that a $10
per hour charge will be collected upon exit from the lot
and that the business is not responsible for damage to the
vehicle while parked in the lot. By entering the lot, the
consumer manifests assent to the transaction concerning
the use of the parking lot, and the terms posted on the
sign are adopted under subsection (a).
9. A consumer visits a department store. A prominent
sign posted at the entrance to the store's parking lot states
that parking is free while visiting the store, and that the

store is not responsible for damage to the vehicle while
parked in the lot. The consumer parks the car in the lot
and browses the store's aisles but does not make any purchase. Upon exit, the consumer discovers that the car
was damaged. By entering the lot, the consumer manifests assent to the transaction concerning the use of the
parking lot and the terms posted on the sign are adopted
under subsection (a)." 90
These examples are contradicted by the law of bailments.
In nearly all cases with similar fact patterns, limitations of liability
must be specifically called to the attention of the adhering party,
and a notice posted on the wall or a limitation printed on the back

89

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, CONSUMER CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST.,

Tentative Draft, 2019), at 24.
90 Id
at 24-25.
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of a claim check ticket is not sufficient.9' For example, in Berrios
v. UnitedParcelServ.,92 the plaintiff, Sally Berrios, sued to recover
damages to her car while it was parked in the defendant's parking
lot. The New Jersey state court found that the defendant's posting
of a sign in the parking lot that it would not be liable for damage
or theft to vehicles or their contents was "ineffective in either warning defendant so as to make the parking lot reasonably safe or in
exculpating defendant from any liability to plaintiff."9 3 That court
also noted:
"Although parking lot or garage proprietors frequently
include an exculpatory clause on the vehicle claim ticket
or post a disclaimer of liability on signs, the majority of
jurisdictions that have addressed this issue have held
such limitations of liability to be ineffective, where the
motorist had not been aware of the liability limitation.

(citations omitted). Moreover, many courts have held
such limitations of liability to be ineffective, regardless of
the motorist's knowledge thereof. (citations omitted)."94
1. RLCC Abolishes the Requirement of Consideration for
Modifications
The RLCC takes the new rule that it created in Section 2
and extends it in Section 3 to abolish the requirement of consideration for modifications. That section states as follows:
"§ 3. Modification of Standard Contract Terms

a. A standard contract term in a consumer contract governing an ongoing relationship is modified if:

91

Allrights, Inc. v. Schroeder, 551 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex. Civ. App. - Hou-

ston [1st Dist.] 1977) ("Where parking lot owners attempt to limit liability by
posting notices on the wall or by printing such a limitation on the claim check,
the limitation must be called to the attention of the bailor before they may become part of the bailment contract. (citations omitted). These provisions are
strictly construed against the bailee.").
92 Berrios v. United Parcel Serv., 265 N.J. Super. 436, 440 (1992).
93 Id at 444.
94 Id at 445.
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1. the consumer receives a reasonable notice of the proposed modified term and a reasonable opportunity to
review it;

2. the consumer receives a reasonable opportunity to reject the proposed modified term and continue the contractual relationship under the existing term, and a
reasonable notice of this opportunity; and
3. the consumer either:
A. manifests assent to the modified term or
B. does not reject the proposed modified term and continues the contractual relationship after the expiration of the rejection period provided in the proposal.
b. A consumer contract governing an ongoing relation-

ship may provide for a reasonable procedure under
which the business may propose a modification of the
standard contract terms, but may not, to the detriment of the consumer, exclude the application of subsection (a), except that the established procedure may
replace the reasonable opportunity to reject the proposed modified term with a reasonable opportunity to
terminate the transaction without unreasonable cost,
loss of value, or personal burden.
c.

A modification of a standard contract term in a consumer contract is enforceable only if it is proposed in
good faith and if it does not have the effect of undermining an affirmation or promise made by the business that was made part of the basis of the original
bargain between the business and the consumer.9 5
This section misconstrues existing law in several ways.

First,

§ 3 permits unilateral modifications and "modification at

will" clauses, which allow companies to engage in bait-and-switch
tactics with consumers. Modification at will clauses permit the
business, but not the consumer, to modify the contract at-will.

95 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, CONSUMER CONTRACTS
(AM. LAW INST.,

Tentative Draft, 2019), at 53.
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Although §3 requires notice, it does not prohibit retroactive modifications.
It is settled law in most states that a party to an executory
contract cannot unilaterally change its terms. In the majority of
jurisdictions, a unilateral right to modify an agreement renders it

illusory, and a contract that permits a party to do so is void for lack
of consideration.9 6 As the Supreme Court of Missouri noted, "contracts...that permit unilateral, retroactive amendment are deemed
illusory and do not constitute consideration to create an enforceable contract." 97 In Nat' Fed'n of the Blind v. The ContainerStore,
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted that a provision in
the Container Store's loyalty program terms and condition that allowed it to "change, modify, cancel, add or remove any or all portions of these terms" rendered the agreement illusory so that "no
agreement to arbitrate" existed between the parties. 98 The First
Circuit also rejected the Container Store's argument that the contract was not illusory because the plaintiffs could terminate at any
time.9 9

The few cases where courts have permitted modification at
will clauses involved the limited context of employment and other
service contracts where the contract may be best understood as a
unilateralcontract where the company (or employee) is providing
ongoing services which are offered and accepted periodically as

See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, supra note 8 at 85 (declining to enforce an
arbitration provision on the ground that it was an illusory promise on the part
of defendant because it contained a modification at will provision); Quality
Products and Concepts v. Nagel Precision, 469 Mich. 362, 365 (2003) (noting
that "the principle of freedom of contract does not permit a party unilaterally to
alter the original contract" and stating that "one cannot unilaterally modify a
contract because, by definition, a unilateral modification lacks mutuality.");
Demasse v. ITT Corp., 194 Ariz. 500, 506 (1999) (stating that "as with other
contracts, an implied-in-fact contract term cannot be modified unilaterally.");
Dows v. Nike, Inc., 846 So.2d 595, 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) ("The unilateral
modification of a contract is unenforceable. Any subsequent modification requires consent and a meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract.").
97 Baker v. Bristol Care, Inc., 450 S.W.3d 770, 777 (Mo. 2014) ("If Bristol
retains unilateral authority to amend the agreement retroactively, its promise to
arbitrate is illusory and is not consideration.").
98 Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, supra note 8, at 86-87.
99Id at 87 ("Similarly unconvincing is the Container Store's argument that
the contract cannot be found to be illusory because Plaintiffs can terminate the
agreement at any time.").
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they are rendered.1' In those cases, the modification must be prospective and the other party has a right to exit without being subject to the modified terms.11 Even in the context of unilateral contracts, the right to modify must be exercised subject to fairness
principles. Moreover, there are strong policy reasons to permit ter-

mination at will of employment and service contracts because forcing people to work in unpleasant environments raises the specter

of involuntary servitude. The RLCC, however, applies to all consumer contracts, and does not limit the application of § 3 to unilateral contracts involving services.
Even in those jurisdictions and in the limited cases where
the contract is best understood as a unilateral one involving services, the "at-will" clause is subject to an implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing,10 2 and not simply a requirement that the terms be
"proposed" in good faith, as stated in § 3(c). As the California Supreme Court stated, "an unqualified right to modify or terminate
the contract is not enforceable. But the fact that one party reserves
100 Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 23 Cal. 4th 1, 14 (2000). ("The mutuality of obligation
principle requiring new consideration for contract termination applies to bilateral contracts only. In the unilateral contract context, there is no mutuality of
obligation.").
101 Wainblat v. Comcast, No. CV. 19-10976-FDS (D.Mass. 2019). The court
agreed that a "unilateral right to modify an arbitration provision can render it
unenforceable," but that in the case before it, Comcast's ability to modify the
agreement was limited. First, it could not modify the arbitration clause with
respect to a pending matter. Furthermore, the arbitration provision contained
a "Right to Opt Out" which could be exercised online or by mail within 30 days.
The court cited to § 13(d) of the Subscriber Agreement which states "IF YOU
DO NOT WISH TO ARBITRATE DISPUTES, YOU MAY DECLINE TO
HAVE YOUR DISPUTES WITH US ARBITRATED BY NOTIFYING US,
WITHIN 30 DAYS...YOUR DECISION TO OPT OUT OF THIS
ARBITRATION PROVISION WILL HAVE NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON
YORU RELATIONSHIP WITH US OR SERVICE(S) PROVIDED BY US.")
Comcast Agreement for Residential Services, https://www.xfinity.com/Corporate/Customers/Policies/SubscriberAgreement. In other words, the subscriber
could either exit the agreement upon modification or opt-out of the arbitration
clause without exiting the agreement. But cf Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, supra
note 8 at 87 (finding that the plaintiff's ability to cancel their loyalty memberships does not prevent retroactive elimination of the arbitration policy and did
not save the agreement from being illusory).
102 Kelley v. City of Mesa, 873 F. Supp. 320, 329 (D. Ariz. 1994) (recognizing
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in at-will employment agreements).
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the implied power to terminate or modify a unilateral contract is
not fatal to its enforcement, if the exercise of the power is subject
to limitations, such as fairness and reasonable notice."0 3 Even this
view is not universally accepted, and some courts will not resort to
the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing to save a contract
with a modification at will clause. As the First Circuit Court of
Appeals in Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. The ContainerStore noted,
while "(o)ther jurisdictions have recognized that the duty of good
faith and fair dealing" limits the discretion of a party to "avoid the
finding of an illusory promise," Texas cases "say nothing about
good faith and fair dealing". Accordingly, the court found that it
did not save the contract from being found illusory.0 4
Furthermore, whether continuing the contractual relationship after the change constitutes acceptance of the new terms is a
"factual question in each case" which depends upon whether the
offeree intended to accept.10 5 § 3, by contrast, imports the new safe
harbor rule of notice-as-assent from § 2 and states that the term
"is" modified provided that certain conditions are met.
Finally, § 3 sanctions a rule that violates the "preexisting
duty rule," which is the long held common law rule that an agreement to do what one is already bound to do cannot serve as consideration to support a contract modification.' 0 6 For example, the
Supreme Court of Iowa in Recker v. Gustafson stated that "new
consideration is necessary to support a contract modification."0 7
In Margeson v. Artis, the Iowa Supreme Court stated, "No consideration exists when the promisee has a preexisting duty to perform
because a promisor is already entitled to receive the promise made
by the promisee and the promisee has only made what amounts to
a gratuitous promise."1 08

Exceptions have been made in some jurisdictions to the
preexisting duty rule but only if the modification is "fair and
103

Asmus, supranote 100 at 4.

Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, supra note 8, at 87.
cos Id at 11; see also Gorlach v. Sports Club Co., 209 Cal.
App. 4th 1497,
1507-08 (Ct. App. 2012) (upholding trial court finding that plaintiff never intended to agree to arbitrate disputes despite continuing to work at company).
106 See Roussalis v. Wyo. Med. Ctr., Inc. 4 P.3d 209, 240 (Sup. Ct. Wyo.
2000).
107 Recker v. Gustafson, 279 N.W. 2d 744, 759
(Iowa 1979).
108 Margeson v. Artis, 776 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Iowa 2009) (The court appeared
to use the words "promisee" instead of "promisor" and "promisor" for "promisee.").
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equitable" and due to unanticipated circumstances. This is the rule
articulated in § 89 of the Restatement (Second) Contracts which
has been adopted by many states.1 09 The RLCC, however, would
substitute the "fair and equitable" standard with mere "good faith."
This is a significant change, as "fair and equitable" goes "beyond
absence of coercion and requires an objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a modification" and the reason must "rest in circumstances not anticipated when the contract was made.""0 Even
then, as the Fifth Circuit articulated, "the relative strength of the
parties, the formality with which the modification is made, the extent to which it is performed or relied on and other circumstances
may be relevant to show or negate imposition or unfair surprise.""'
Significantly, "fair and equitable" refers to the substance of the
modification unlike § 3 of the RLCC which applies "good faith"
only to the spirit in which the business "proposed" the term, and
does not consider the content or nature of the modified term itself.
Moreover, § 3 of the RLCC discards the current Restatement's requirement of unanticipated circumstances, not even bothering to
give it a mention.

Oddly, the RLCC states that subsection (c) provides
"stronger protection by targeting the substance of the modified
terms" and then cites to Badie v. Bank ofAmerica ("good faith limits the business to making modifications that were within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of the initial contract.")" 2 Yet, the RLCC's reference to Badie is incongruous and

even misleading because §3 (c) does not incorporate the substantive limitationrequired by that case; it only incorporates the constraint upon the exercise of the business's discretion. The only substantive limitation provided for in Subsection §3(c) is that the
proposed modification should not have the effect of "undermining
an affirmation or promise" that was made "part of the basis of the
original bargain between the business and the customer." This is
109 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 89 (permitting modifications to
contracts "not fully performed on either side" if the modification is "fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract
was made"); see also Roussalis, supra note 105 at 240 (noting that Restatement
(Second) Contracts § 89 is an "exception" to the pre-existing duty rule).
110 McCallum Highlands, Ltd. v. Wash. Cap. Dus, Inc., 66 F.3d 89, 95 (5th
Cir. 1995) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 89 cmt. b).
" Id.

112

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, CONSUMER CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST.,

Tentative Draft, 2019), at 65-66.
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almost precisely the same language used by the lower court which
the Badie court rejected:
"Thus, the trial court's conclusion that the Bank's modification of the account agreements satisfied the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing because '[t]he ADR clause
does not operate to deprive the customer of expected or
bargained-for benefits of his or her agreement' does not
withstand scrutiny. The court's focus on the ADR
clause, standing alone was misplaced: it is the Bank's exercise of its discretionary right to change the agreement,
not the ADR clause in and of itself, which must first be
analyzed in terms of the implied covenant.""
According to the court, "good faith" refers to the Bank's exercise of its discretionary power, not the substance of the modification. That does not, however, mean that the substance of the modification is irrelevant.
To the contrary, the court in Badie
overturned the lower court and found that the modification clause
did not permit the addition of an alternate dispute resolution clause
because "when the account agreements were entered into, the parties did not intend that the change of terms provision should allow
the Bank to add completely new terms such as an ADR clause
simply by sending out a notice." Furthermore, it stated:
"As a general rule...the fact that one of the parties reserves the power of varying the price or other performance is not fatal [i.e., does not render the contract illusory and unenforceable] if the exercise of this power is
subject to prescribed or implied limitations, as that the
variation must be in proportion to some objectively determined base or must be reasonable."(emphasis added).
Despite the rhetorical framing of the RLCC, § 3 (c) falls
short of what Badie requires. Badie requires the business to exercise its discretion in good faith andto limit its modification to those
terms contemplated by the parties at the time the contract was
formed. The RLCC, by contrast, would permit all modifications
proposed in good faith unless they undermine the bargain. To put
it more plainly, the universe of allowable modifications permitted
by the Badie court is much smaller than that allowed by § 3(c). The

13 Id at 795.
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Badie court would only permit those modifications "whose general
subject matter was anticipated when the contract was entered
into" such as where the "modifications in question were specifically
identified in the original contracts as changes that might be made
in the future under certain circumstances."" 4 § 3(c), by contrast,
would allow changes to any term - even those not contemplated as
part of the bargain-as long as they were proposed in good faith.
This shift has the potential to significantly alter the expectations of consumers. Consumers expect they have certain rights
under the law which are not part of the basis of the bargain but
nevertheless are important to them. These rights can include various constitutional and statutory rights, including the right to a
trial by jury or the right to participate in a class action lawsuit.
Companies do not make promises to provide these types of rights
to consumers as part of the bargain because these rights already
belong to the consumer. The consumer may agree to relinquish
these rights in a contract, but the right is not granted by the company. Yet, § 3(c) excludes only those modifications which are not
proposed in "good faith" or which "have the effect of undermining
an affirmation or promise made by the business that was made
part of the basis of the original bargain between the business and
the consumer." In other words, § 3 (c) would permit companies to
modify terms that result in the elimination or diminishment of con-

sumers' rights because those rights are not the result of promises
made by the company and are not part of the "basis of the bargain."
Rather than clarifying the murky area of law surrounding
modifications, § 3 further muddles it. It confuses a minority rule
that permits a modification of a unilateral services contract by the
offering party with a unilateral right to modification of all con-

sumer contracts. Furthermore, it would remove the requirement
that a modification without consideration be substantively fair and
equitable and replace it with a rule that requires only that the modification be "proposed" by the business in "good faith." It also dispenses with the Restatement Second's requirement that modifications be limited to those arising due to unanticipated circumstances
and restrict only those that undermine the bargain. Although at
first glance, § 3 (b) and § 3 (c) might appear to benefit the consumer,
they actually permit companies to diminish consumers rights and
make it nearly impossible for consumers to escape unilateral

14

Id at 281.
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modifications, even when those modifications defeat consumers'
reasonable expectations.

IV. THE IVORY TOWER PRAGMATISM OF THE RLCC
The general perspective of the RLCC seems to be that since
consumers can't be expected to read contracts, their assent is irrelevant. Furthermore, it presumes that the formalities of contract
formation are unnecessary since the consumer would agree to the
terms anyway because the consumer has no bargaining power.
The RLCC tackles exploitation and overreaching directly by
strengthening the policing doctrines, including the doctrine of un-

conscionability. The approach is pragmatic in that it reflects a certain truth about the marketplace - businesses unilaterally control
the terms of transactions and customers have no choice but to
agree to them. The idea of a free market under this view is - like
the notion of assent - a mere fiction. Under the RLCC approach,
the State - in the form of the courts - must intervene to police un-

fair terms because the buying and selling of goods is not the result
of informed bargaining.
There are two primary shortcomings with the RLCC's

pragmatism. The first is that its pragmatism is not actually practical. Its approach ignores the real world and the prevalence of
mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts." 5 These
clauses would divert most consumer claims into private proceedings where the arbitrator would make decisions regarding unconscionability and fairness. The RLCC's response to claims about
the effect of arbitration clauses is indifference, stating:
"In recent decades, an important question regarding the
scope of the unconscionability safeguard is the effect of
limits (stipulated in standard contracts terms) on the ability of consumers to pursue a complaint or to seek reasonable redress, particularly by channeling all disputes to arbitration or barring class actions. Many courts have held
that imposing express or de facto class action bars on
See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Privatein Courts, and the Erasureof Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804
(2015) (noting the "mass production of arbitration clauses" which does not result
in "mass arbitration" but instead, "erasing" rights as "few who are cut off from
using the courts and required (rather than choosing) to arbitrate do so"); Id at
115

2808.
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consumers is unconscionable, because such limitations
render the enforcement of consumer contractual rights
impractical. Recently, however, the enforceability of
these terms has turned also on the provisions of various
federal statutes. One such statute is the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which has been held by the U.S. Supreme
Court to preempt, in some cases, the application of the
common-law doctrine of unconscionability to arbitration
clauses.
The interpretation of the FAA and of other federal rules
that regulate the procedures for consumers' access to justice is outside the scope of the common law of consumer
contracts. This Restatement states the principles that, in
the absence of constraints of federal law, guide the application of the doctrine of unconscionability under state
law. It takes no position on the proper application of the
Federal Arbitration Act or other statutes governing enforceability of or limits on arbitration provisions, and the

way such statutes affect the application of the unconscionability standard."16
In other words, the RLCC proposes ex-post judicial scrutiny of terms as protection from unfairness created by the noticeand-manifestation standard-but then recognizes that this solution is merely a sham because consumers would almost never be
able to have a contractual claim heard in a court of law.
The second shortcoming is that the RLCC ignores that a
fundamental precept of the free market is that parties enter their
transactions informed and voluntarily. But in today's world, consumers are neither voluntarily entering into their contracts or being informed of their terms. Unlike when contracts were contained

on paper, the user's failure to read electronic adhesive contracts is
rational and imposing a duty to read is unrealistic given their unreadability"' and the ubiquity of digital terms. The RLCC ignores

116

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, CONSUMER CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST.,

Tentative Draft, 2019), at 4.
117 See Uri Benoliel & Shmuel I. Becher,
The Duty to Read the Unreadable,
60 B.C. L. REV. 2255 (2019) (testing the readability of sign-in-wrap contracts
and finding them "generally unreadable"); Id at 2259. Elsewhere, I have suggested that businesses should have a "duty to draft reasonably" which would
consider the ways that the online contracting environment differs from the
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how essential the Internet is to the lives of citizens, and it ignores
how impossible it is to bargain for different terms or shop elsewhere for them, given the monopoly-like power of certain companies (Google, Facebook, Amazon) and how use of their services
may be required by schools, employers, and even civic institutions.
The manifestation of consent is not voluntary given the ubiquity
of the terms and the necessity of accessing their services in order to
partake in modern society.
The RLCC ignores the ways that the digital form of contracts affects how they are used and how they are perceived. Digital contracts are, intangible, weightless, nearly costless and easy to
reproduce. Consequently, businesses are likely to use them for
more transactions, their terms are likely to be more abundant (and
onerous), and the consumer is even less likely to notice them than
their printed counterpart. Off-line, a business would not print out
a fifty-page document for every ten-dollar purchase. It would cost
too much in terms of printing and customer good will.

Even if

consumers don't read their paper contracts, they realize that a
business handing them a stack of papers to consummate a transaction wants more from them than the money being paid. The bigger

-

the stack of legal documents, the more important the transaction
and the consumer knows it whether the consumer reads them or
not. Online, however, a click is a click - and a three-page agreement is perceived the same as one that is three-hundred pages.
Even the progenitor of the notice-and-manifestation standard,
ProCD v. Zeidenberg, could hardly have anticipated the way that
wrap contracts have run amok or that its holding would be the
precedent for the current broken state of rubber-stamping noticeas-contract. The contracts referenced by Judge Easterbrook to
validate the shrinkwrap license were airline tickets, concert tickets
and in-box warranties - all of which were physically constrained
and tangible. The back of a ticket or a slip of paper in a package
can contain only so many words. Even insurance contracts which
are many pages in length signal the number of terms they contain
and are subject to the "reasonable expectations" doctrine,"' (which
offline one. See Nancy S. Kim, The Duty to DraftReasonablyand Online Contracts, in LARRY A. DIMATTEO ET AL., COMMERCIAL
TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE (Cambridge, 2013).

CONT.

LAW:

118 Max True Plastering Co. v. US Fid. & Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861, 866 (Okla.
1996) (adopting the reasonable expectations doctrine and noting that of "thirtysix jurisdictions which have addressed the reasonable expectations doctrine ... only four courts" have rejected it.").
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the RLCC conveniently discards in favor of a "rule" of notice-andmanifestation).

The result is that today there are digital terms covering
every transaction online - even when the equivalent transaction
offline is made without a contract. As Mark Lemley noted,
"(o)ffline...it is too much effort to get consumers to sign the standard forms...most consumer transactions do not involve any written contract with the vendor at all....Nonetheless, many of those
same retail outlets impose standard form contracts on their online
users, probably because it is easier to get someone to click "I agree"
as part of an online transaction than it is to have a clerk obtain a
signature on a written form.""1 9 Because the terms are unread and
often unnoticed, they tend to be more onerous and overreaching,
extracting important rights from the user, such as the right to a
jury trial and privacy rights.' There is no real opportunity to read
if the user is asked to read many pages for every online transaction,
especially if those terms may be frequently updated. Many websites allot only a few minutes to complete a transaction before the
timed transaction is terminated and the user has to start again.
The RLCC ignores these realities of online contracting.
The tragedy of the RLCC is that it dismisses consent and
the purpose of contracts which is to promote the intent of the parties and their reasonable expectations. It also overlooks the role of
contracts in a free, fair and functioning marketplace, and that essential to that role is consent. 121 Contracts require consent, and
consent requires that the consumer act both voluntarily and knowingly; it is not enough that the consumer engaged in a "manifestation" if the consumer did not understand the consequences of doing
so or if the consumer had no reasonable alternative. 2 2 The noticeSee Mark Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 466 (2006).
Colin Marks has empirically studied the nature of terms that restrict consumers' rights in a pair of articles and found that they are onerous and often
apply only to online transactions. See Colin P. Marks, Online and "As Is" 45
PEPP. L. REV. 1(2018) (analyzing the prevalence of clause that limit consumers'
rights in online retailers terms of use); Colin P. Marks, Online Terms as In Terrorem Devices, 78 MD. L. REV. 247 (2019) (finding that retailers include restrictive clauses in their online terms that they do not include as part of their in-store
transactions).
121 See Cal. Civ. Code § 1150, subdivision 2; see also Mitri v. Arnel Mgmt.
Co., 157 Cal. App. 4th 1164, 1170 (Ct. App. 2007).
12 I have explained elsewhere that consent requires three conditions:
a
manifestation, knowledge and voluntariness.
See NANCY S. KIM,
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and-manifestation standard is a legal fiction that replaces actual
consent with constructive consent. The notice-and-manifestation
standard doesn't promote freedom of contracts -it promotes coercion. Consumers do not consent to what is in unread fine print
because consent requires knowledge; one cannot consent to something that one doesn't know exists. Consumers do not consent
when a company changes its terms of service and locks them out
of their phone, social network, or email until they click 'accept';
one cannot consent when the alternative to the "manifestation" is
a forfeiture. Coercion and abuse of market power lead to unfairness in the marketplace and ultimately, greater regulation and increased transaction costs. When consumers discover objectionable
business practices disclosed only in unread fine print, they respond
through the political process. Regulation becomes necessary because private ordering has failed; however, regulation typically
comes too late, is often less than effective, and imposes substantial
transaction costs in the form of compliance requirements. 2 3 The
massive market failure surrounding data collection and privacy,
the rise of surveillance capitalism, 2 4 and the hodgepodge of privacy legislation" 5 provide recent examples.

CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS (2019) (explaining how this defi-

nition of consent "generally captures the basic requirements of consent put forth
by other scholars."); Id at 9.
123 See Lauren E. Willis, Performance-BasedConsumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1309, 1316-29 (2015) (discussing the shortcomings of disclosure and design
regulation).
124 SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE
FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2018) (re-

ferring to the economy surrounding the selling of personal data).
125 See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, Ca. Civ. Code. §1798.100
et. seq., and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (European Union
law which applies to U.S. companies that collect personal data of European citizens, residents and maybe even visitors); See Art. 3 (2) - Territorial scope ("This
Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are
in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union....") See
also the GDPR.eu website https://gdpr.eu/compliance-checklist-us-companies/
(March 8, 2020). The International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP)
has a comparison of the different U.S. state privacy laws on its website to "aid
our members' efforts to stay abreast of the changing state-privacy landscape."
It also states, "State-level momentum for comprehensive privacy bills is at an
all-time high."
https://iapp.org/news/a/us-state-comprehensive-privacy-lawcomparison/ (March 8, 2020).
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V. CONCLUSION

The RLCC's adoption of the notice-and-manifestation rule
may have been a well-intentioned effort to increase marketplace
efficiency, but it is likely to backfire because it ignores how the real
world of consumer contracting works. A true belief in the free market requires honesty about the meaning of consent. The standard
of notice-and-manifestation discards consent and replaces it with
a coercive legal fiction. This legal fiction was constructed out of
ideology. The RLCC promotes a particular academic school of
thought - the Chicago law and economics perspective1

2

6

- and a

particular methodology - empirical research in place of legal analysis 27 But data can be misconstrued, and it can be interpreted in
different ways. The methodology of the law is case analysis, not
case counting. The law differs from the social sciences in its methodology for a reason. Case counting runs the risk of missing trends
in the law or overlooking the reasons why the case law developed
the way it did.12 8 In law school, students are told that facts matter
The Chicago School of Law and Economics has historically had close ties
to corporations and generally promoted free markets and conservative economics. See Robert Van Horn, Corporationsand the Rise of Chicagolaw and economics, 47 JOURNAL OF ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 477 (2018). Van Horn argues
that there has been "an active corporate presence" in the law and economics
movement and a "dynamic relationship between corporations and Chicago law
and economics from 1946 through the mid-1950s." Id. at 478. See also Neil H.
Buchanan and Michael C. Dorf, A Tale of Two Formalisms: How Law and
Economics Mirrors Originalism and Textualism, at 70, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3553508 (concluding that "the economic theory underlying L&E is inherently subjective" and that law and economics, like originalism and textualism, has been used "consistently to advance
to goals of the American conservative movement.").
127 In this context, I use the term "legal analysis" to refer to the application
of facts to rules examined through cases. See Suzanne E. Rowe, Legal Research,
Legal Writing, and Legal Analysis: Putting Law School Into Practice, 29
STETSON L. REV. 1193, 1193 (2000) (describing legal analysis as a "complex, interwoven process"). For definitions of the terminology of "facts" and other terms
arising from case analysis, see Arthur L. Corbin, LegalAnalysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163 (1919).
128 Mark Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 462 (2006) ("all of
the courts that have refused to enforce browsewrap licenses have done so against
a commercial entity, generally one that competes with the drafter of the license"
while "virtually all of the courts that have refused to enforce a browsewrap license have done so against a commercial entity.").
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and those who read only case excerpts and the holding are not engaging in essential legal reasoning. Law students eventually learn
that whyand howthe court reached its holding is just as important
as what it held.
The common law develops and is constantly in the process
of developing based on society's needs. The purpose of the ALI
and the Restatements is to explain a body of law in a way that accords with society's evolving needs. But the approach adopted by
the RLCC seeks to transform the body of law - common law - into
legislated ideology. It would replace legal analysis with data. But
data without analysis only reflects where the law is and what
courts have ruled in the past. It does not reflect the dynamism in
the law and the way it is changing; it provides no roadmap for how

to proceed into the future.
The contracts scholar, Melvin Eisenberg, writes in his comprehensive, masterful book, Foundational Principles of Contract
Law:

"In contract law, as in life, all applicable meritorious policy goals and moral values should be taken into account,
even if those values and goals may sometimes conflict,
even if one value or goal trumps another in given cases,
and even at the expense of complete determinacy."1 29
Although powerless against corporations as individuals,
collectively, consumers have power which they can exercise
through class action lawsuits and through the publicity that these
lawsuits generate. But corporations have squelched the collective
power of consumers with standardized forms that impose mandatory arbitration clauses and ban class actions,"' and they will continue to do so if the law continues to recognize these forms as contracts.
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See Hila Keren, Divided and Conquered: The Neoliberal Roots and
Emotional Consequences of the Arbitration Revolution, FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming) (arguing that "the imposition of mandatory arbitration has become a
leading strategy of corporations, later approved by the Court, to wield arbitration clauses as weapons against any collective proceedings, regardless of forum.
Therefore, these clauses impede collective acts both in courts (class actions) and
in arbitration (class arbitrations)").
Id at 4.
Available at https://pa130

pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3468939.
496

2020]

Ideology, Coercion and the ProposedRestatement

This raises the question - what is the point of a Restatement
of ConsumerContracts if it ignores the contracting realities faced
by consumers? What is the point if it doesn't account for the inherent coerciveness that distinguishes consumer contracts from
other contracts?
The answer - there is no point.
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